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Contrastivism	about	knowledge	is	the	view	that	one	does	not	just	know	some	
proposition.	It	is	more	adequate	to	say	that	one	knows	something	rather	than	
something	else:	I	know	that	I	am	looking	at	a	tree	rather	than	a	bush	but	I	do	
not	know	that	I	am	looking	at	a	tree	rather	than	a	cleverly	done	tree	imitation.	
Knowledge	is	a	three-place	relation	between	a	subject,	a	proposition	and	a	
contrast	set	of	propositions.	There	are	several	advantages	of	a	contrastivist	
view	but	also	certain	problems	with	it.				
1.	 Contrastivism	
2.	 Pro	Contrastivism	
3.	 Contra	Contrastivism			
1.	 Contrastivism		According	to	an	orthodox	view,	knowledge	is	a	binary	relation	between	a	subject	and	a	proposition.	Contrastivism	about	knowledge	(or	“contrastivism”)	is	the	view	that	
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knowledge	is	rather	a	ternary	relation	between	a	subject,	a	(true)	target	proposition	and	a	(false)	contrast	proposition	(or	a	set	of	contrast	propositions)	which	is	incompatible	(but	cf.	Rourke	2013,	sec.2)	with	the	target	proposition.	The	form	of	a	knowledge-attributing	sentence	is	“S	knows	that	p,	rather	than	q”	rather	than	“S	knows	that	p”	(see	Sinnott-Armstrong	2004	and	2008,	Schaffer	2004a,	2005,	2007a,	2007b,	2008,	Karjalainen	and	Morton	2003,	Morton	2013;	see	also	Morton	2011	and	Schaffer	2012a).	To	say,	for	instance,	that	Jean	knows	that	there	is	a	dog	in	front	of	her,	is	elliptical	and	short	for	the	claim	that	Jean	knows	that	there	is	a	dog	in	front	of	her	rather	than,	say,	a	cat.	This	is	compatible	with	Jean	not	knowing	that	there	is	a	dog	in	front	of	her	rather	than	a	wolf.		Contrastivism	shares	certain	similiarities	with	relevant	alternative	views	according	to	which	knowledge	does	not	require	that	the	subject	can	rule	out	all	alternative	possibilities	but	only	the	“relevant”	ones.	Relevant	alternatives	views,	however,	typically	stick	with	a	binary	analysis	of	knowledge	(see,	e.g.,	Dretske	1970).	Some	contrastivists	embrace	contextualism,	-	the	view	that	the	meaning	of	a	knowledge	sentence	varies	with	the	context	of	the	speaker;	they	claim	that	the	set	of	contrast	propositions	is	determined	by	the	speaker’s	context	(see,	e.g.,	Schaffer	2005;	for	a	non-contextualist	contrastivism	see	Sinnott-Armstrong	2002,	2004).		Before	epistemologists	developed	contrastivist	accounts	of	knowledge	(and	other	epistemic	relations)	philosophers	of	science	proposed	contrastivist	accounts	of	explanation	or	causation	(see,	e.g.,	Hitchcock	and	Schaffer	in	Blaauw	2013b).	Recently,	some	authors	have	developed	contrastivist	accounts	of	practical	reasons	
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and	of	related	notions	(see	Snedegar	2013	and	Sinnott-Armstrong	1996,	2006;	see	also	Sinnott-Armstrong,	Driver	and	Snedegar	in	Blaauw	2013b).	There	are	also	contrastivist	views	about	justification	or	confirmation	(see	Fitelson	in	Blaauw	2013b	and	Sinnott-Armstrong	2002,	2004,	2006,	ch.5)	or	about	belief	(see	Blaauw	2013a	and	Baumann	2008,	appendix).			
2.	 Pro	Contrastivism		Contrastivists	take	some	encouragement	for	their	views	from	data	about	ordinary	usage	of	terms	like	“knowledge”	(see,	e.g.,	Schaffer	2008	or	2005,	sec.3).	However,	recent	experimental	data	have	not	led	to	much	agreement	here	(see	Schaffer	and	Knobe	2012	but	also	Pinillos	2011,	DeRose	2011,	Gerken	and	Beebe	2016).		Other	kinds	of	arguments	seem	to	carry	more	weight.	Jonathan	Schaffer	has	presented	a	couple	of	linguistic	arguments	(see	Schaffer	2004a,	77-79,	2005,	sec.3).	First,	even	though	knowledge	ascriptions	often	have	an	explicitly	binary	form	there	is	reason	to	assume	that	there	is	a	hidden	variable	for	contrasts	because	there	are	also	explicitly	ternary	forms	of	knowledge	ascriptions.	Second,	there	are	phenomena	of	binding	by	quantifiers	which	suggest	a	hidden	variable	for	contrasts	(“On	every	test,	Jones	knows	that	the	substance	is	A”	is	analyzed	along	the	lines	of	“For	every	test	and	for	every	alternative	substance	in	the	test,	Jones	knows	that	the	tested	substance	is	A	rather	than	the	alternative”).	Third,	contrast	preservation	under	ellipsis	also	suggests	a	hidden	contrast	variable:	If,	e.g.,	Holmes	knows	that	Mary	stole	the	bicycle	rather	
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than	the	wagon,	then	“Holmes	knows	that	Mary	stole	the	bike,	and	Watson	does	too”	preserves	the	contrast	in	the	case	of	Watson.	Fourth,	focus	differences	suggest	hidden	variables	for	contrasts:	“Mary	STOLE	the	bike”	suggests	a	contrast	with	borrowing	etc.	while	“Mary	stole	the	BIKE”	suggests	a	contrast	with	wagon	etc.	Fifth,	the	assumption	of	hidden	contrast	variables	can	explain	surface	paradoxes	(see	also	Schaffer	2004a,	81).	Suppose	that	Jill	can	distinguish	between	dogs	and	cats	but	not	between	dogs	and	wolfs.	Facing	a	dog,	one	wants	to	say	both	that	she	knows	that	there	is	a	dog	(rather	than	a	cat)	and	that	she	does	not	know	that	there	is	a	dog	(rather	than	a	wolf).	For	a	detailed	critique	of	all	these	arguments	by	Schaffer	see	Rickless	2014.	A	further,	semantic	argument	concerns	the	relation	between	knowledge	and	questions	(see	Schaffer	2005,	sec.1-3,	2007a,	2007b	and	Sawyer	2014,	sec.2):	Knowing	some	proposition	is	knowing	the	(correct)	answer	to	a	(contextually	salient)	particular	question.	Since	“all	well-formed	questions	are	multiple-choice	questions”	(Schaffer	2007a,	240),	the	known	answer	to	a	question	is	contrastive	in	nature,	and	thus	also	the	knowledge	of	the	corresponding	proposition.	One	might	wonder	whether	“knowing	is	knowing	the	answer”	(Schaffer	2007b,	383).	Even	if	knowing	only	requires	knowing	the	answer	(still	a	controversial	claim)	it	is	not	obvious	that	knowledge	inherits	contrastivity	from	the	latter	or	from	the	contrastive	nature	of	the	question.	Apart	from	that,	not	everyone	does	agree	that	all	questions	are	multiple-choice	questions.		
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Adam	Morton	has	argued	that	since	tracking	of	objects	is	contrastive	(I	can	see	that	you	went	into	the	kitchen	rather	than	the	bathroom	but	I	cannot	see	which	part	of	the	kitchen),	the	corresponding	knowledge	is	contrastive,	too	(see	Morton	2013,	sec.1-2).	Similarly,	since	evidence	is	contrastive	(I	have	evidence	that	I	am	talking	to	Chuck	rather	than	Jill	but	not	that	I	am	talking	to	Chuck	rather	than	his	twin	brother),	the	corresponding	knowledge	is	contrastive,	too	(see	Morton	2013,	sec.3).	However,	since	characteristics	of	a	necessary	condition	of	some	X	need	not	be	characteristics	of	X,	too,	it	would	be	interesting	to	see	more	detailed	arguments	here	(see	also	Sawyer	2014,	sec.2	here	with	respect	to	perceptual	knowledge).	Contrastivism	also	offers	solutions	to	major	epistemological	problems	like	the	following	skeptical	puzzle	(containing	plausible	premises	and	an	implausible	conclusion):	Jay	does	not	know	that	he	has	not	been	deceived	by	some	Cartesian	demon	into	falsely	believing	that	he	has	hands;	if	he	does	not	know	the	latter,	then	he	does	not	know	that	he	has	hands;	hence,	Jay	does	not	know	that	he	has	hands	(see,	for	many,	DeRose	1995,	1).	This	easily	generalizes	with	respect	to	subjects,	propositions	and	sceptical	scenarios.	The	conditional	premise	is	usually	supported	by	some	principle	of	epistemic	closure	under	known	entailment	(schematically	and	roughly:	If	S	knows	that	p,	and	if	S	also	knows	that	p	entails	q,	then	S	knows	that	q).	Given	knowledge	of	the	relevant	conditional	(If	I	have	hands,	then	I	have	not	been	deceived	by	some	Cartesian	demon	into	falsely	believing	that	I	have	hands),	the	second,	conditional	premise	of	the	skeptical	argument	follows.		
	 6	
The	contrastivist	has	an	elegant	solution	for	this	skeptical	paradox	(see	Schaffer	2004,	80,	2004b,	2005,	sec.5).	If	one	makes	the	relevant	contrasts	explicit,	then	the	premises	and	the	alleged	conclusion	have	to	be	reformulated.	It	turns	out	then	that	Jay	does	not	know	that	he	has	hands	rather	than	being	deceived	by	some	Cartesian	demon	into	falsely	believing	that	he	has	hands;	however,	it	also	turns	out	that	Jay	knows	that	he	has	hands	rather	than,	say,	stumps.	No	sceptical	argument	goes	through	and	the	paradox	is	resolved.	By	limiting	the	scope	of	both	common	sense	and	scepticism,	the	contrastivist	can	make	the	two	views	compatible	with	each	other:	Subjects	do	know	ordinary	propositions	like	I	have	hands	but	cannot	know	that	they	are	not	in	a	sceptical	scenario.	The	contrastivist	can	do	this	while	holding	on	to	a	principle	of	closure	(for	a	contrastivist	closure	principle	see	especially	Schaffer	2007a).		The	contrastivist	response	to	scepticism	is	in	some	ways	very	similar	to	contextualist	responses	and	is	as	controversial	as	the	latter	(see	the	exchange	between	Luper	2012	and	Blaauw	2012).	Does	common	sense	not	contain	stronger	claims	(“I	just	know	that	I	have	hands,	period!”)	than	the	weaker	contrastive	ones	(“Sure,	I	know	that	I	have	hands	rather	than	wings!”)?	And	is	not	the	point	of	scepticism	its	damaging	effect	on	ordinary	knowledge	claims	rather	than	just	the	denial	that	one	can	know	that	one	is	not	in	some	extravagant	sceptical	scenario?		Finally,	it	has	been	argued	that	contrastivism	can	capture	and	describe	the	stage	and	progress	of	inquiry:	It	can	explain	in	detail	what	is	known	and	what	is	not	(yet)	known	–	which	(multiple-choice)	questions	can	be	answered	at	a	certain	stage	and	
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which	not	(see	Schaffer	2004a,	81,	2005,	237).	Contrastivism	thus	describes	the	epistemic	abilities	and	accomplishments	of	subjects	in	more	detail	than	binary	accounts.			
3.	 Contra	Contrastivism		There	are	alternatives	to	contrastivist	explanations	of	the	way	people	talk	about	knowledge.	Some	people	argue	that	the	relevant	contrasts	concern	knowledge’s	content,	correctly	characterizable	as	adjunctive	(“p	rather	than	q”;	see	Blaauw	2008,	sec.2),	as	conjunctive	(“p	and	not	q”;	see	Jespersen	2008	and	also	Kallestrup	2009,	sec.1),	or	as	conditional	(“if	p	or	q,	then	p”;	see	van	Woudenberg	2008,	283,	passim;	see	against	this	kind	of	strategy	Schaffer	2008).	A	more	serious	threat	to	contrastivism	is,	perhaps,	the	objection	that	the	contrastivist	leaves	something	important	out	when	they	ascribe	knowledge	that	p,	rather	than	q:	The	subject	might	typically	work	with	the	assumption	that	either	p	or	q	is	true	(see	Becker	2009,	253-254).	If	the	corresponding	(multiple-choice)	question	(“p	or	q?”)	provides	information	and	testimonial	knowledge	to	the	subject	that	one	of	the	two	is	true	(see	Montminy	2008,	130-131),	then	there	is	still	a	good	case	for	a	binary	knowledge	attribution	(the	subject	knows	that	p	by	disjunctive	syllogism).	Schaffer	has	replied	that	the	subject	need	not	be	aware	of	the	question	and	also	does	not	need	to	trust	the	would-be	informants	(see	Schaffer	2005,	250,	fn.20;	see	also	Steglich-Petersen	2015	on	the	role	of	presuppositions).	
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A	further	objection	says	that	contrastivism	makes	knowledge	“too	easy”	in	many	cases.	Somebody	who	has	next	to	no	clue	about	Mongolia	could	still	know	that	Ulan	Bator	rather	than	Vatican	City	is	the	capital	of	Mongolia	(see	Montminy	2008,	130-132).	Intuitions	diverge	on	this:	Some	(see,	e.g.,	Schaffer	2005,	257)	hold	that	this	is	not	so	implausible.	As	long	as	one	does	not	deny	the	difficulty	of	knowing	some	things,	it	might	be	fine	to	accept	the	easiness	of	knowing	some	other	things.	A	related	objection	(see	Becker	2009,	255-256)	says	that	the	contrastivist	analysis	is	vulnerable	to	a	problem	of	“lucky	questions”.	For	instance,	someone	who	finds	themselves	unwittingly	in	fake	barn	county	but	happens	to	look	at	one	of	the	few	veritable	barns	might	thus	count	as	knowing	that	there	is	a	barn	rather	than	a	farmhouse	in	front	of	them.	However,	the	belief	that	there	is	a	barn	is	true	only	by	luck	and	thus	cannot	qualify	as	knowledge.	This	constitutes	another	way	in	which	knowledge	might	come	“too	easily”,	given	contrastivism.	The	contrastivist	could	reply	that	while	the	subject	does	not	know	that	there	is	a	barn	rather	than	a	fake	barn	in	front	of	them,	they	still	know	that	it	is	a	barn	rather	than	a	farmhouse.	Apart	from	that,	the	contrastivist	could	embrace	the	view	that	knowledge	is	compatible	with	this	kind	of	luck.	A	contrastivist	account	of	belief	might	offer	additional	resources	to	escape	this	objection:	The	belief	that	that’s	a	barn	rather	than	a	farmhouse	might	not	qualify	as	lucky.		Even	if	contrastivism	is	somewhat	plausible	one	might	wonder	whether	all	knowledge	is	contrastive.	What	for	instance	is	the	contrast	proposition	for	knowledge	that	2+2=4?	2+2=4	rather	than	what?	There	does	not	seem	to	be	a	plausible	answer	
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to	this	question.	Similar	things	can	be	said	about	basic	logical	knowledge	(I	know	that	everything	is	self-identical	rather	than	what?)	or	semantic	knowledge	(I	know	that	vixen	are	female	foxes	rather	than	what?).	It	does	not	help	to	say	that	in	such	cases	the	contrast	proposition	is	simply	the	negation	of	the	target	proposition;	this	would	trivialize	contrastivism	and	make	it	collapse	into	a	binary	view	(see	Morton	and	Karjalainen	2008,	272	but	also	cf.	Buenting	2010).	So,	contrastivism	might	only	have	some	plausibility	for	certain	kinds	of	knowledge,	like	knowledge	based	on	discriminatory	cognitive	abilities	(e.g.,	perceptual	ones),	but	not	for	others	(see	Becker	2007,	83,	Baumann	2008,	sec.1,	and	Luper	2012,	56;	on	the	role	of	discrimination	here	see	Schaffer	2004b,	Morton	and	Karjalainen	2008,	and	Sawyer	2014,	sec.2).	Finally	(echoing	certain	objections	against	contextualism),	one	could	point	out	that	normally	subjects	are	blind	to	the	contrastivity	of	knowledge	attributions.	Does	the	contrastivist	then	have	to	offer	a	convincing	error	theory	which	explains	the	systematicity	of	the	mistake?	It	might	be	an	open	empirical	question	whether	people	are	or	are	not	aware	of	contrastive	effects.	Apart	from	that,	one	might	also	simply	accept	and	even	defend	the	claim	of	semantic	blindness	(see	Schaffer	and	Szabó	2014,	533-535).		But,	one	might	follow	up,	how	is	thought	and	communication	about	knowledge	possible	when	speakers	and	hearers	are	blind	to	the	existence	of	a	third	relatum?	Are	they	then	even	talking	or	thinking	about	it	at	all	(in	the	full	sense)?	On	the	other	hand,	how	is	thought	about	knowledge	possible	when	they	are	not	blind	to	the	contrasts:	
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Would	not	normal	subjects	be	overloaded	by	the	additional	complexity?	And	how	then	is	communication	possible	if	(as	perhaps	usual)	the	contrasts	the	speaker	has	in	mind	are	not	made	explicit	to	the	hearer	(and	vc.	vs.)?	Can	one	simply	rely	on	the	idea	that	normally	speakers	and	hearers	share	the	same	context	and	thus	the	same	set	of	contrast	propositions?	At	least	some	of	these	open	questions	can	only	be	answered	on	an	empirical	basis.			
See	also:	CONTEXTUALISM,	EPISTEMOLOGICAL;	EPISTEMIC	RELATIVISM;	KNOWLEDGE,	CONCEPT	OF;	RELEVANT	ALTERNATIVES;	SCEPTICISM;	SUBJECT-SENSITIVE	INVARIANTISM			
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